Main description:

The Peripheral Mind introduces a novel approach to a wide range of issues in the philosophy of mind by shifting the focus of analysis from the brain to the Peripheral Nervous System (PNS). Contemporary philosophy of mind has neglected the potential significance of the PNS and has implicitly assumed that, ultimately, sensory and perceptual experience comes together in the brain. Istvan Aranyosi proposes a philosophical hypothesis according to which
peripheral processes are considered as constitutive of sensory states rather than merely as causal contributors to them. Part of the motivation for the project is explained in the autobiographical opening chapter, which describes the author's subjective experiences with severe peripheral nerve damage.

Although Aranyosi's approach could be classified as part of the current "embodied mind" paradigm in the philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience, this is the first time that notions like "embodiment" and "body" in general are replaced by the more focused concept of the PNS. Aranyosi puts the hypothesis to the test and offers novel solutions to puzzles related to physicalism, functionalism, mental content, embodiment, the extended mind hypothesis, tactile-proprioceptive illusions, as well
as to some problems in neuroethics, such as abortion and requests for amputation of healthy body parts. The diversity of the volume's methodology-which results from a combination of conceptual analysis, discussion of neuroscientific data, philosophical speculation, and first-person phenomenological
accounts-makes the book both engaging and highly informative.

Contents:

Preface and Acknowledgments ; Chapter I: Margins of Me: a Personal Story ; PART 1: MINDS AND NERVES ; Chapter II: A Philosophical Hypothesis ; II.1 PMH as a philosophical hypothesis ; II.2 PMH and the case of visual awareness research ; II.3 Causal versus constitutive contribution ; Chapter III: Return of the C fibers, or Philosophers' Lack of Nerve ; III.1 Well, maybe the mind is the brain ... somewhere ; III.2 Folk neuroscience and the philosophy of mind ; III.3 Nervous systems and closet sunsum theory ; Chapter IV: Toward a Well-Innervated Philosophy of Mind ; IV.1 'It's just cables!' ; IV.2 Functionalist troubles? ; The mad pain problem ; The problem of pseudo-normal vision ; The China-brain problem ; The triviality problem ; PART 2: BOUNDS OF MIND ; Chapter V: Semantic Externalism ; V.1 Twin Earth ; V.2 Anti-Narrowness and Determination ; V.3 Anti-wideness ; V.4 Skinternalism: an Anti-Internalist Individualism ; V.5 Some further issues ; Chapter VI: Mind Extended ; VI.1 Allegedly extended processes ; VI.2 Allegedly extended states ; PART 3: MIND EMBODIED ; Chapter VII: Embodiment and the Peripheral Mind ; VII.1 'Fingers crossed for the embodied mind!' ; VII.2 Phenomenal embodiment and innervation ; VII.3 Against proper disembodiment ; Chapter VIII: Against Action as Constitutive of Mind ; VIII.1 Embodied central processing ; VIII.2 The conceptual role of the Neuromuscular Junction ; VIII. 3 A brief critique of action-based (sensorimotor) theories ; PART 4: MIND AND ETHICS ; Chapter IX: Issues in Neuroethics ; IX.1 Abortion: Thick potentiality ; IX.2 Amputation: Peripheral precedence ; Chapter X: Concluding Remarks ; References ; Name Index ; Topic Index